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Abstract 
The paper examines the impact of stock market liberalisation on four industry-level 
economic variables, i) growth in real value added, ii) growth in real wages per 
worker, iii) growth in the number of employees and iv) growth in the number of firms 
using data on 18 developing countries for the period between 1981 -  2000. Genetic 
programming methodology is used to determine the liberalisation dates. Results from 
difference-in-differences regression indicate that stock market liberalisation has 
minimal impact on the growth of real value added.  On the other hand, growth rates 
of real wages per worker, number of employees and number of firms are significantly 
higher for most countries after stock market liberalisation. 
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1. Introduction
1 
The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed many developing countries, among other 
economic reforms, liberalizing their stock markets.  The large number of 
liberalisations has motivated economists and policymakers to examine the 
consequences of these liberalisations.  Interest was further fuelled after countries 
such as Mexico and those in East Asia were hit by financial crises.  Literature on the 
impact of stock market liberalization can be divided into two broad groups, those that 
focus on macroeconomic variables and those on financial variables.  Table 1 
provides a list of previous studies.    
The objective of the paper is to determine whether stock market liberalisation has 
any effect on various economic variables.  It differs from previous studies in three 
important respects.  First, the paper looks at the effects of stock market liberalisation 
on four industry-level economic variables, specifically (a) real growth in value added, 
(b) real growth in wages per worker, (c) growth in number of employees, and (d) 
growth in number of firms.  Second, the paper uses Genetic Programming (GP) 
methodology to determine the market liberalization dates.  Third, the paper uses 
difference-in-differences regression to examine the impact of liberalisation on the 
various economic variables. 
The impacts of stock market liberalisation are examined using data on 18 
developing countries from 1981 to 2000.  The external financing needs of the 
industrial sectors are first determined.  The five sectors that have the highest 
external equity financing needs are (i) professional and scientific equipment, (ii) other 
chemicals, (iii) electrical machinery, (iv) non-electrical machinery and (v) industrial 
chemicals.  On the other hand, the five sectors that have the lowest external equity 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Dr Zhang Xibin of Monash University for allowing me to use his codes for genetic programming.   3
financing needs are (i) wood products, (ii) pottery, (iii) textile, (iv) rubber products 
and (v) fabricated metal products.  Of the 18 countries examined, 10 countries 
exhibit multiple breaks.  These breaks could signify further liberalisations or reversals 
of capital flows.  Further analyses show that of these 10 countries, five countries 
experience a net outflow of capital.  Results from difference-in-differences regression 
seem to suggest that stock market liberalisation does not have any impact on the 
growth rates of value added.  On the other hand, growth rates for wages per worker, 
growth rates for number of employees and growth rates for number of firms are 
significantly higher following stock market liberalisation.     
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 computes the 
external equity financing needs of the various industrial sectors.  Section 3 outlines 
the GP approach and reports the stock market liberalisation dates. Section 4 
presents the difference-in-differences methodology and results.  Section 5 concludes 
and summarizes.  
 
2.  External Equity Financing Needs of Industries 
The external equity financing needs of the industrial sectors are approximated by two 
indicators.  Fisman and Love (2003) compute the indicator by dividing the difference 
between total assets and retaining earnings by total assets.  As this indicator 
measures dependence on general external financing, the formula has to be modified 
before it can be used here.  This is accomplished by further subtracting long-term 
liabilities from the numerator.  The resultant formula (EQFIN) is as follows.  
Assets Total
  s Liabilitie   Term   Long -   Earnings   Retained   -   Assets   Total
EQFIN =    4
 Annual data on total assets, retained earnings and long-term liabilities of US firms 
for the period between 1980 and 1999 are collected from the entire COMPUTSTAT 
database.  EQFIN is calculated for all individual firms in each and every industrial 
sector and for each and every year.  Medians of EQFIN are then computed for all the 
industrial sectors.  Average industry medians for the periods 1980-89 (EQFIN80) and 
1990-99 (EQFIN90) are then calculated.  The higher the EQFIN, the greater is the 
demand for external equity finance for that industrial sector. 
  As the COMPUTSTAT database contains only accounting information on public 
listed companies, EQFIN may be inadequate in identifying the industries’ need for 
external equity financing.  Thus, the ratio of number of public listed companies to 
total number of companies (PTR) for each industrial sector is also used.  Similar to 
EQFIN, the higher the PTR, the greater is the demand for external equity finance for 
that sector.  The number of US public and private companies in each industrial 
sector for the years 1990 and 1998 are obtained from Ward’s Business Directory.  
Data on these two years are chosen purely for data availability reason.  As the data 
from these two sources are classified using the US Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes, to make the data suitable for subsequent analysis, the codes are 
converted to the United Nation’s International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) codes, using the appropriate concordance table
2.     
  EQFIN80 ranges from 26% to 66% with a mean of 49% while EQFIN90 ranges 
from 34% to 98% with a mean of 61%.  PTR90 varies from 1% to 18% with a mean 
                                                 
2  The data used are on US companies.  The assumption that external equity financing needs of US industries are 
representative of the needs of companies in developing countries is made out of necessity, as data on developing countries are 
generally not available.  Moreover, in developing countries, with a repressed financial system, misallocation of funds is 
rampant, funds often flow to inefficient public enterprises and to privileged sectors and not to the sectors that need it the most.  
To capture the actual industries’ needs for external equity financing, it is more appropriate to consider a country with well-
developed capital market, where the allocation of equity funds is optimal.   5
of 5% whereas PTR98 varies from 2% to 20% with a mean of 8%
3.  To establish the 
overall external equity financing needs, the 28 industrial sectors are ranked 
separately according to their EQFIN80, EQFIN90, PTR90 and PTR98.  A 1 is 
assigned to the sector with the lowest EQFIN80, a 2 is assigned to the sector with 
the next lowest EQFIN80, and so on.  The exercise is repeated for the other three 
indicators.  The ranks are then averaged across the four indicators
4.  Table 2 shows, 
with their respective average rank, the five industrial sectors with the lowest external 
equity financing needs and the five industrial sectors with the highest external equity 
financing needs.  The five industrial sectors with the lowest external equity financing 
needs are (i) wood products, (ii) pottery, (iii) textile, (iv) rubber products and (v) 
fabricated metal products while five industrial sectors with the highest external equity 
financing needs are (i) professional and scientific equipment, (ii) other chemicals, (iii) 
electric machinery, (iv) machinery and (v) industrial chemicals.  It can be seen that 
the sectors that have the low external equity financing needs are mostly labour-
intensive industries while those with high external financing needs are capital-
intensive industries. 
 
3.  Identifying Stock Market Liberalisation Dates Using GP 
Stock market liberalisation dates are determined for 18 developing countries using 
GP
5 
6.  Given the dependent variables, independent variables (known as terminals) 
                                                 
3 The need for a complement indicator is justified by the low correlations between the two indicators.  The lowest correlation is 
0.26 (between EQFIN80 and PTR98) and the highest correlation documented is 0.6 (between EQFIN90 and PTR90).  In 
contrast, the correlations between EQFIN80 and EQFIN90 and between PTR90 and PTR98 are 0.8 and 0.94 respectively.  This 
signifies that relative financing needs of the industrial sectors remain stable over the years. 
4 The rationale for converting to ordinal data to determine the external equity financing needs is to mitigate any distortion 
caused by drastic changes in the percentages.  For example, for the period 1980-89, EQFIN for the Tobacco industry is a mere 
36%; it jumps to 72% for the period 1990-99. 
5 The 18 countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
6 The methodology differs from that used by Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002a) in a couple of ways. It is nonparametric 
and model-free, and thus has the advantage of being less sensitive to minor perturbations, which may give rise to spurious 
structural changes.  More importantly, GP can be used to identify multiple structural breaks in a multivariate framework.  This   6
and a set of operators (known as activity functions), basic genetic programming 
(BGP) selects a model that best fits the time series.  It does so by generating many 
equations by randomly selecting and combining independent variables and 
operators.  Each set of equations is known as an individual (or a GP-tree) and the 
collection of individuals is called a population.  The program solves each individual 
equation and then assigns it a fitness value according to how well it solves the 
problem.  BGP then creates a new generation of individuals by applying the 
evolutionary process of reproduction and crossover
7.  The probability of being 
selected for the reproduction and crossover operations depends on the fitness value.  
The fitter the individual, the higher is the chance of being chosen.  The evolutionary 
process of creating fitter individuals continues until the maximum number of 
generations specified by the user is attained.  Recursive genetic programming (RGP) 
differs from BGP in that the former breaks the whole sample into sub-samples and 
performs BGP on the various sub-samples.  The details of the RGP process are 
outlined below. 
 
Step 1  
Specification of 5 basic elements required in RGP.  
(i)  Set of activity functions 
The activity function used in this study is defined as follows, 
{ } exp log, cos, sin, , , , , ÷ × − + = F  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
comes in useful when countries liberalize their stock markets in stages or when countries experience subsequent net capital 
outflows for a significant period of time. 
7 Reproduction is an asexual operation and requires only one individual (parent).  The result of the reproduction operation is 
one child equation.  In contrast, crossover is a sexual operation that involves two individuals from the previous generation.  The 
result of this operation is two offspring equations.  The difference between reproduction and crossover is that the former 
operation does not create new individuals; the child equation is just a direct replica of its parent whereas the latter creates new 
individuals containing parts of equation from both parents.   7
(ii) Set of terminals  
Let the largest lagged order be denoted as MLAG.  The terminal set in the genetic 
process for m-dimensional multivariate system is represented as follows, 
{ } MLAG h x x x m h t h t h t , , 2 , 1 : , , , , 2 , 1 , L L = = − − − κ  
(iii) Fitness value 
The fitness of each individual is computed through a fitness function, fit(.), and is 









ts i x fit  
(iv) Parameters for controlling the run 
The population size is set at 100. The maximum lag (MLAG) used is 6.  Crossover is 
performed on 90% of the population and the probability of being selected for 
crossover is equal to the inverse of their fitness values.  The crossover point is 
determined arbitrarily by the computer.  Reproduction is performed on 10% of the 
population.  Thus, 10 individuals from each generation are selected from the 
population with a probability equal to the inverse of their fitness values.  The 
maximum number of variables allowed in the equations, known as tree depth is set 
at 20.   To perform RGP, the sample has to be broken down into sub-samples.  In 
this study, the number of observations in each sub-sample (N1) is 12.  The second 
sub-sample is the modification of the first sub-sample by moving forward by N2 
steps.  N2 is fixed at 3 in this paper.   Thus, there will be a total of T=[(N – N1)/N2 + 1] 
sub-samples.  The final step of RGP will require the computation of the average 
fitness value for the sub-sample. The first q smallest fitness values will be used to 
calculate the average fitness and q is set at 10.      
   8
(v) Criterion for designating a result and terminating a run 
The single individual with the highest fitness value over all the generations is chosen 
as the result of the run.  Each run is terminated at end of the tenth generation. 
 
Step 2   
Generate an initial generation for the first sub-sample by randomly selecting a 
function from F.  Denote the number of input variables for the selected function as 
N(f).  The selected terminal will be connected with the N(f) terminal in the next layer.  
An element is then chosen from set B =  κ ∪ F  as the final terminal.  If the selected 
element is a function of F, then a second element will be selected so that the GP-
tree keeps growing.  If the selected element is a terminal from κ, then the GP-tree 
will terminate.  This selection process continues until 100 GP-trees are generated.  
Fitness values for the individuals are calculated as described above.  Individuals with 
the smallest fitness values are selected for the reproduction and crossover 
operations to create the next generation.  At the tenth generation, the fitness value of 
each GP-tree is arranged in ascending order, () ()( ) ⋅ ≤ ≤ ⋅ ≤ ⋅ 100 2 1 fit fit fit L .  The first 10 










i fit fit  
The same process is applied to the second sub-sample with the initial generation 
being the last generation of the first sub-sample. The average fitness of last 
generation of the second sub-sample is similarly obtained and is denoted as  2 fit .  
The process is repeated with the remaining sub-samples. 
   9
Step 3 
When BGP has been performed on all the sub-samples, there will be T average 













Dk reflects the relative change in average fitness between two adjacent sub-samples.  
D1 is fixed at 1.  If a structural change occurs in the k*-th sub-sample, then the 
average fitness for the k*-th sub-sample will be larger than the average fitness for 
the (k*-1)-th sub-sample, i.e.  1 *
* − > k k fit fit , and the statistics Dk is will be greater than 
one.  After the k*-th sub-sample, the individuals in the system will accustom to the 
new operating pattern, and if there is no further structural change, the average 
fitness of the (k*+1)-th sub-sample will be similar to that for the k*-th sub-sample, 
and Dk will be one
8.   
Four monthly financial time series, namely monthly stock returns, volatility, 
correlation and the ratio of monthly US net equity flows to market capitalization are 
used individually and quadravariately as inputs to GP to identify structural breaks.  
Volatilities are estimated using a GARCH (1,1) model.  Correlations between country 
and world returns are computed using a 36-month moving window.  The monthly 
data on individual country stock indexes are collected from Standard and 
Poor’s/International Finance Corporation Emerging Markets Database, while the 
monthly net equity capital flows from US are obtained from the US Treasury Bulletin.  
                                                 
8 This brings in the question of how much greater than one must Dk be for it to be qualified as a structural break.  This is a 
difficult question.  Setting the threshold too high may yield the conclusion that there is no structural break, while having too low 
a threshold will result in too many structural breaks.  So far, there are no studies addressing this issue.  Following Lien, Tse and 
Zhang (2003), the threshold for this study is fixed at 1.2.   10
A stock index computed by Datastream is used as a proxy for the world market 
portfolio.  The structural break dates are reported in Appendix A1
9.       
As factors other than stock market liberalisation are also likely to induce a 
structural break, only break dates that appear in both the quadravariate framework 
and in at least two univariate settings, are being considered as break dates due to 
stock market liberalisation.  Due to the possibility that one time series could lead or 
lag the other time series in its breaks, dates that fall within one quarter before or after 
each other are viewed as the same break.   
To further ensure that the break dates identified are due to stock market 
liberalisation, dates that satisfied the above requirement are subject to further 
testing.  This is done by examining whether the values of nine financial and 
macroeconomic variables before and after the break dates are significantly different 
and whether the changes in the variables are consistent with what have been argued 
theoretically and observed empirically in previous studies
10.  The final month of the 
break quarter identified by the quadravariate framework is used as the break month.  
To perform the test, the following regression equation is run, 
t 1 o t D y ε + β + β =  
where yt is one of the nine variables above, D is a dummy variable and equals 0 for 
periods before the break dates and equals 1 for periods after the break dates.  To 
mitigate any possible contamination due to the transition period, data three months 
prior and three months subsequent to the break months are excluded.  If there are 
                                                 
9 Since the next sub-sample is obtained by moving the period forward by one quarter, structural breaks can only be identified 
for a specific quarter.  This explains why the dates reported are for a period of three months. 
10  The nine monthly financial and macroeconomic variables are (i) stock returns, (ii) dividend yield, (iii) market 
capitalization/GDP, (iv) net equity flows from US/market capitalization, (v) correlation, (vi) turnover ratio, (vii) value traded/GDP, 
(viii) inflation and (ix) total trade/GDP.  Data on dividend yields market capitalization, value trade, turnover ratio are collected 
from Standard and Poor’s/International Finance Corporation Emerging Markets Database, while data on inflation, imports, 
exports and gross domestic product (GDP) are obtained from International Financial Statistics published by the IMF.  As annual 
GDP numbers are collected, it is divided by 12 before it is used as denominators.  Total trade is the sum of imports and exports 
for the month.  As the impact of stock market liberalisation on volatility is inconclusive, the variable is excluded.   11
multiple breaks for the country, the regression period ends three months before the 
next break date.  Newey-West corrected t-statistics are used to determine the level 
of significance.  If stock market liberalisation occurs, β1 for US returns, dividend yield 
and inflation are hypothesized to be negative, whereas β1  for market 
capitalization/GDP, net equity flows from US/market capitalization, correlation, 
turnover ratio, value traded/GDP, and total trade/GDP are hypothesized to be 
positive.  Conversely, if considerable amount of foreign capital leaves and stays 
away from the countries for a significant period, the opposite is expected to hold
11.    
The results are reported in Appendix A2.      
Most countries have multiple breaks.  Of the 18 countries examined, 10 countries 
have at least two breaks.  They are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.  The other eight 
countries, Chile, India, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Taiwan and Zimbabwe, 
have only one significant break.  For all the countries, regression results for the first 
break (and for some countries the only break) are in line with what have been 
hypothesized for market liberalisation.  Of the 10 countries that have two or more 
breaks, five of them, namely Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Greece and Turkey, show 
further stock market liberalisation.  Turkey has the biggest number of breaks and all 
indicate stock market liberalisation.  Regression results for the remaining five 
countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela, 
show a reversal of the liberalisation process.   
 
                                                 
11 There is concern that prejudice could be introduced when the variables used to identify break dates are also used to test 
whether these variables are significantly different before and after the break.  Such concern should not arise, as the regression 
results may not be consistent with what is being hypothesized.   12
4.  Impacts of Stock Market Liberalisation on Industry-level Economic 
Variables 
The impact of stock market liberalisation on four industry-level economic variables, 
namely, (a) growth in real value added, (b) growth in real wages per worker (c) 
growth in number of employees and (d) growth in number of firms are examined for 
17 countries
12.  Annual data on value added, wages, number of employees and 
number of firms required for difference-in-differences regressions are collected from 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics 
Database (3-digit)
13.     
Since only annual data are available, the break months have to be converted to 
break years.  If the break falls on or before June, that year will be the break year; if 
the break occurs after June, the following year will be the break year.  For example, 
the break year for Chile is 1990 since the break month is before June.  On the other 
hand, the break year for Taiwan is 1989 since the break appears after June.   
Another point to note is that, for some countries, data for periods showing signs of 
reversal to the market liberalisation process are excluded.  For example, data on 
Malaysia after 1997 are excluded as there are signs indicating a reversal of the 
market liberalisation process on June 1998.      
The difference-in-difference regression is as follows, 
it t i 4 t 3 i 2 1 i it d td td td t y µ + λ + λ + λ + λ + γ =  
where yit is the variable of interest, γi is the intercept term that is allowed to vary from 
one industry to another, t is a time trend.  The dummy variable, di equals to zero if 
                                                 
12  Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe for the period 1981 – 2000.  Brazil is not examined because the available 
data are too sparse for any meaningful study.   
13  The analyses in this paper are restricted to industrial sectors for two reasons, (i) to mitigate distortions due to the 
dependence on country-specific factors such as natural resources, and (ii) only data on industrial sectors are available from 
UNIDO database.   13
the industry belongs to the control group and equals to one if the industry belongs to 
the treatment group, while dt, equals to zero before stock market liberalisation and 
equals to one after stock market liberalisation and εit is the error term and satisfies 
the assumption, E[µit|di,dt] = 0.    The coefficient of interest is λ4, which shows the 
growth rates of the economic variables of the treatment group, after taking into 
consideration the growth rates of economic variables of the control group, pre- and 
post stock market liberalisation.  If stock market liberalisation increases the real 
growth rates of value added, real growth rates of wages per worker, growth rates of 
number of employees and growth rates of number of firms, then λ4 should be 
positive.    
  In this paper, the control group is selected in two different ways.  Since the 
industries have been segregated according to their external equity financing needs, 
this is a good starting point.  When markets liberalize and foreign funds flow into the 
countries, industries with the greatest needs of external equity financing will benefit 
the most.  In contrast, industries that have low external equity financing needs will 
not be significantly affected.  Earlier results show that the five industries that have 
the lowest external equity financing needs are (i) wood products, (ii) pottery, (iii) 
textile, (iv) rubber products and (v) fabricated metal products.  These five industries 
could thus serve as a control group (Control Group 1).  Since both the control group 
and the treatment group are from the same country, it is very likely that stock market 
liberalisation is the only factor that affects the treatment group and not the control 
group.  But there are also shortcomings.  On one hand, the two groups of industries 
are not similar.  On the other, there could be spillover effect from one group of 
industries to the other.  In order to overcome these limitations, a second control 
group is also used (Control Group 2).  The economic variables of the five industries   14
that have the highest external equity financing needs are compared to those of 
identical industries in countries that have not liberalized their stock markets.  The 
countries are selected using information from IFC emerging stock markets factbook.  
At the end of year 2001, the control countries were still considered non-investible by 
the IFC
14.  To mitigate the problem of country-specific factors distorting the 
regression results, data on the six countries are averaged.  Regressions using 
official liberalisation dates reported in Bekaert and Harvey (2000b) as break dates 
are also performed. 
  Table 3 shows the difference-in-differences regression results for real value 
added growth.  Panel A shows the results when Control Group 1 is used.  Of the 17 
countries examined, only one country (Indonesia) shows significantly higher real 
value added growth.  After stock market liberalisation, real value added growth in 
Indonesia is, on average, 4% higher.  Therefore, the results seem to suggest that 
stock market liberalisation has no effect on economic growth.  Results using official 
liberalisation dates as break dates are not significantly different.  Panel B shows the 
corresponding regression results when Control Group 2 is used.  The results 
reinforce the view that stock market liberalisation plays an insignificant role in 
promoting economic growth.  Of the 17 countries examined, only three countries 
show significantly higher value added growth following stock market liberalisation.  
Stock market liberalisation increases real value added growth rate by 5.8%, 4.6% 
and 1.2% for Chile, the Philippines and Thailand respectively.  Real value added 
growth rates for Indonesia, however, are no longer significantly higher when Control 
Group 2 is used.  When official liberalisation dates are used as break dates, real 
                                                 
14 The six control countries are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Kenya and Mauritius. As Bulgaria does not have 
sufficient data on value added and number of firms, the country is excluded as a component of the control group when 
examining the impact of stock market liberalisation on real value added growth and growth in number of firms.   15
value added growth rate for Thailand is no longer significantly higher.  In contrast, 
real value added growth rates for Argentina, Greece, Indonesia and Korea are 
shown to be significantly higher following stock market liberalisation.  Thus, the 
results seem to suggest that the relationship between financial liberalisation and 
economic growth is weak. 
  Panel A of Table 4 presents the difference-in-differences regression results for 
growth in real wages per worker when Control Group 1 is used.  Only two countries 
show a significantly higher wages per worker growth rate after stock market 
liberalisation.  Real growth in wages per worker is 1.8% higher in Greece and 1.7% 
higher in Venezuela.  Results from regressions using official liberalisation dates as 
break dates are similar.  Panel B reports the regression results when Control Group 
2 is used.  Real wages per worker growth rates are, on average, 5% higher following 
stock market liberalisation.  The nine countries that show significantly higher real 
wages per worker growth rates are Argentina (by 4.8%), Chile (by 9%), Colombia (by 
4.3%), Greece (by 3.6%), Indonesia (by 2.7%), Mexico (by 7.4%), Thailand (by 
3.9%), Turkey (by 9%) and Venezuela (by 2.4%).  On the other hand, India, Korea, 
South Africa and Taiwan have lower real wages per worker growth after stock 
market liberalisation.  The growth rates fall by 1.8%, 5.5%, 1.5% and 2.4% 
respectively for the four countries.  When the official liberalisation dates are used, 
growth rate for Indonesia is no longer significantly higher.  On the other hand, growth 
rate for Zimbabwe is now significantly lower.  
  Regression results for growth in number of employees are shown in Table 5.  
Panel A shows that when Control Group 1 is used, four countries have significantly 
different growth rates in number of employees after stock market liberalisation.   
While results for Argentina, Indonesia and Zimbabwe show higher growth rates,   16
results from Venezuela shows lower growth rate.  When Control Group 2 is used, 
results are more consistent and they indicate that stock market liberalisation raises 
the growth rates of number of employees by 3.4%.  The 13 countries that saw higher 
growth in number of employees after stock market liberalisation are Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.  The highest growth rate is seen in the 
Philippines (5.9%) whereas the lowest growth rate is seen in Thailand (1.2%). 
  The difference-in-differences regression results from Tables 4 and 5 indicate that 
stock market liberalisations benefit workers by increasing their employment 
opportunities and at the same time enjoy higher real wages.  The fall in the cost of 
equity capital reduces the cost of production.  This encourages firms to produce 
more, which then translates into higher demand for labour and higher wages per 
worker.  The higher wages paid to worker could also be justified by their higher 
productivity.  Marginal product of labour increases as each worker is now equipped 
with a greater amount of capital.   
  Table 6 presents the regression results for growth in number of firms.  Results 
are inconclusive when Control Group 1 is used. Of the 11 countries examined, only 
four countries have significantly different growth rates. Of these four countries, three 
countries, namely Jordan, the Philippines and Thailand, have higher growth rates 
and the remaining one (Venezuela) shows lower growth.  When Control Group 2 is 
used, regression results indicate that stock market liberalisation increases the growth 
in number of firms.  Seven of the 11 countries examined have higher growth rates.  
The seven countries are India (2.7%), Indonesia (1.8%), Jordan (5.9%), the 
Philippines (3.3%), Thailand (3.6%), Venezuela (2.7%) and Zimbabwe (2.9%).  Thus, 
results suggest that stock market liberalisation promotes entrepreneurship.    17
5. Conclusions 
The impacts of stock market liberalisation on (i) growth in real value added, (ii) 
growth in real wages per worker, (iii) growth in number of employees and (iv) growth 
in number of firms using data on 18 developing countries for the period 1981 – 2000 
are examined.   
Examining specifically industries that benefit the most from stock market 
liberalisation allows us to better evaluate the impact of stock market liberalisation on 
the four economic variables.  To find out what these industries are, the paper uses 
two indicators to measure their needs for external equity financing.  The first 
measure is computed by subtracting retained earnings and long term liabilities from 
total assets and then divides the results by total assets.   The second measure is the 
ratio of number of public companies to total number of companies.  Results show 
that the five industrial sectors with the lowest external equity financing needs are (i) 
wood products, (ii) pottery, (iii) textile, (iv) rubber products and (v) fabricated metal 
products whereas the five industrial sectors with the highest external equity financing 
needs are (i) professional and scientific equipment, (ii) other chemicals, (iii) electric 
machinery, (iv) machinery and (v) industrial chemicals.   
The use of official liberalisation dates is not suitable, as liberalisation does not 
signify the actual movement of capital.  Using genetic programming, it is found that 
most of the countries have liberalisation dates later than the official liberalisation 
dates.  Furthermore, most of these countries have multiple liberalisation dates.  For 
all the countries, the first break dates indicate stock market liberalisation, but 
subsequent break dates signify further liberalisation for some countries and reversal 
for others.  The countries that exhibit reversals to the market liberalisation process 
are mostly from East Asia.     18
Results from difference-in-differences regression show that stock market 
liberalisations have little impact on the real growth rates of value added.  On the 
other hand, growth rates of real wages per worker, growth rates of number of 
employees and growth rates of number of firms are significantly higher for most 
countries after stock market liberalisation.      
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Table 1 List of Previous Studies  
 
 
Types of variables  Variables  Authors 
Macroeconomic   Economic growth  Henry (2003), Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002), Edison, Levine, Ricci and Sloek 
(2002), Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001b), Levine and Zervos (1998), Kraay 
(1998), Rodrik (1998) 
  Private investment   Henry (2003), Henry (2000b)   
  Inflation  Kim and Singal (2000), Bekaert and Harvey (2000a) 
  Exchange rates  Kim and Singal (2000), Bekaert and Harvey (2000a) 
  Trade  Bekaert and Harvey (2000a) 
  Government spending  Bekaert and Harvey (2000a) 
  Income equality  Das and Mohapatra (2003) 
  Capital flow   Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002b) 
    
Financial   Cost of equity  Henry (2003), Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002b), Bekaert and Harvey (2000b), 
Errunza and Miller (2000) 
  Risk  Chari and Henry (2004), Kim and Singal (2000), Bekaert and Harvey (1997), de Santis 
and Imrohoroglu (1997) 
  Stock prices  Henry (2000a), Kim and Singal (2000) 
  Stock market fluctuations  Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Edwards, Biscarri and de Gracia (2003) 
  Stock market efficiency   Jain-Chandra (2002), Kim and Singal (2000) 
 Liquidity    Jain-Chandra  (2002) 
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Table 2 Industries with the Lowest and Highest External Equity Financing Needs 
 
Industrial sectors are ranked separately according to their EQFIN80, EQFIN90, PTR90 and 
PTR98.  A 1 is assigned to the sector with the lowest EQFIN80, a 2 is assigned to the sector 
with the next lowest EQFIN80, and so on.  The exercise is repeated for the other three 
indicators.  The ranks are then averaged across the four indicators. 
 
 Average  Rank 
Industries with the lowest external equity financing needs  
Wood products, except furniture (331)   2.00 
Pottery, china and earthenware (361)  6.25 
Textile (321)  7.50 
Rubber products (355)  7.50 
Fabricated metal products (381)  7.75 
   
Industries with the highest external equity financing needs  
Professional and scientific equipment (385)  27.50 
Other Chemicals (352)  24.75 
Machinery, electric (383)  24.25 
Machinery, except electric (382)  21.50 




Table 3 Difference-in-differences Regression Results for Growth in Real Value Added 
 
The difference-in-differences regression equation is  it t i 4 t 3 i 2 1 i it d td td td t y µ + λ + λ + λ + λ + γ = , where yit 
is real value added, γi is the intercept term that is allowed to vary from one industry to another, t is a 
time trend.  The dummy variable, di equals to zero if the industry belongs to the control group and 
equals to one if the industry belongs to the treatment group, while dt, equals to zero before stock 
market liberalisation and equals to one after stock market liberalisation. λ4 shows whether the value 
added growth rates are significantly different after stock market liberalisation, after taking into 
consideration the growth rates of economic variables of the control group. The t-statistics are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity.  Panel A shows results when industrial sectors with the lowest 
external equity financing needs are used as control group. Panel B shows results when identical 
industrial sectors in countries that have not undergone stock market liberalisation are used as control 
group. The second column presents results using break dates determined by GP.  The third column 
presents results using official liberalisation dates.  The comment ‘Break date coincides’ means that 
the official liberalisation date coincides with that determined by GP.  
 
Panel A: Control Group 1 
  GP-determined break dates  Official liberalisation dates 
  λ4 t-stat.  λ4 t-stat. 
Argentina   0.0233   1.3812   0.0260  0.8315 
Chile   0.0273   1.4001  Break date coincides 
Colombia  -0.0079  -1.1113  Break date coincides 
Greece   0.0063   0.6011   0.0207  1.0244 
India   0.0005   0.0736  Break date coincides 
Indonesia   0.0392   2.6193**   0.0678   3.6879** 
Jordan -0.0328  -1.3457    0.0031    0.1092 
Korea -0.0050  -0.2234  -0.0017  -0.1512 
Malaysia -0.0114 -1.0013  -0.0157  -0.7349 
Mexico -0.0257  -1.6047  -0.0287  -1.4639 
Philippines  -0.0009  -0.0444  Break date coincides 
S. Africa  -0.0069  -0.8497  n.a.  n.a. 
Taiwan -0.0038  -0.2477  -0.0014  -0.1555 
Thailand   0.0906   1.5711    0.0966   1.1899 
Turkey   0.0140   0.7771  Break date coincides 
Venezuela -0.0060  -0.4995  -0.0085  -0.8675 
Zimbabwe   0.0185   0.9809    0.0283   1.6461 
 
** 1% level of significance 




Panel B: Control Group 2 
  GP-determined break dates  Official liberalisation dates 
  λ4 t-stat. λ4 t-stat. 
Argentina 0.0355 1.8475  0.0917    2.5006* 
Chile  0.0577  2.7115**  Break date coincides 
Colombia  0.0110  0.7946  Break date coincides 
Greece 0.0112  0.6423  0.0478    2.1281* 
India  -0.0045  -0.4531  Break date coincides 
Indonesia 0.0180 1.1599  0.0792      3.9788** 
Jordan -0.0238  -1.6857  -0.0172    -1.2623 
Korea 0.0054  0.2544  0.0372      3.0494** 
Malaysia 0.0139  1.0191  0.0317      1.3748 
Mexico -0.0097  -0.4952  -0.0130    -0.5894 
Philippines  0.0459  2.5327*  Break date coincides 
S. Africa  -0.0214  -1.9185  n.a.  n.a. 
Taiwan -0.0268  -1.5784  -0.0345  -1.7676 
Thailand 0.0120  2.2149*  0.0146      1.9387 
Turkey  0.0302  1.4022  Break date coincides 
Venezuela 0.0197  1.5715  0.0213    1.1564 
Zimbabwe 0.0128  0.7236  -0.0017  -0.1018 
 
** 1% level of significance 




Table 4 Difference-in-differences Regression Results for Growth in Real Wages Per 
Worker 
 
The difference-in-differences regression equation is  it t i 4 t 3 i 2 1 i it d td td td t y µ + λ + λ + λ + λ + γ = , where yit 
is real wages per worker, γi is the intercept term that is allowed to vary from one industry to another, t 
is a time trend.  The dummy variable, di equals to zero if the industry belongs to the control group and 
equals to one if the industry belongs to the treatment group, while dt, equals to zero before stock 
market liberalisation and equals to one after stock market liberalisation. λ4 shows whether the growth 
rates in real wages per worker are significantly different after stock market liberalisation, after taking 
into consideration the growth rates of economic variables of the control group.  The t-statistics are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Panel A shows results when industrial sectors with the lowest 
external equity financing needs are used as control group. Panel B shows results when identical 
industrial sectors in countries that have not undergone stock market liberalisation are used as control 
group. The second column presents results using break dates determined by GP.  The third column 
presents results using official liberalisation dates. The comment ‘Break date coincides’ means that the 
official liberalisation date coincides with that determined by GP. 
 
Panel A: Control Group 1 
  GP-determined break dates  Official liberalisation 
dates 
  λ4 t-stat.  λ4 t-stat. 
Argentina -0.0084  -0.3579 -0.0048  -0.1415 
Chile  -0.0085  -0.6232  Break date coincides 
Colombia  0.0006  0.1083  Break date coincides 
Greece 0.0181  2.0066*  0.0102  0.7142 
India  -0.0003  -0.0688  Break date coincides 
Indonesia -0.0024  -0.3316 -0.0115  -1.1789 
Jordan -0.0008  -0.0808  -0.0006  -0.0012 
Korea -0.0061  -0.4345  -0.0020  -0.2582 
Malaysia -0.0060  -1.3506  -0.0152  -1.6082 
Mexico 0.0037  0.2490  0.0048  0.3075 
Philippines  -0.0065  -0.9486  Break date coincides 
S. Africa  -0.0072  -1.4245  n.a.  n.a 
Taiwan -0.0006  -0.0633  -0.0028  -0.4963 
Thailand 0.0083  0.4836  0.0015  0.0854 
Turkey  -0.0005  -0.0278  Break date coincides 
Venezuela 0.0171  1.9851* 0.0194 2.1952* 
Zimbabwe 0.0012  0.1239 0.0039  0.3987 
 
** 1% level of significance 
* 5% level of significance  
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Panel B: Control Group 2 
  GP-determined break dates  Official liberalisation dates 
  λ4 t-stat. λ4 t-stat. 
Argentina  0.0482   2.5927*   0.1633   6.3736** 
Chile  0.0903   5.9712**  Break date coincides 
Colombia  0.0434   6.8337**  Break date coincides 
Greece  0.0359   3.9747**   0.0622   4.5593** 
India  -0.0176   -3.5672**  Break date coincides 
Indonesia  0.0267   4.2654**   0.0156   1.9318 
Jordan -0.0069    -0.8434  -0.0047  -0.7547 
Korea -0.0554  -5.1244**  -0.0221  -3.3358** 
Malaysia  0.0089   1.5541   0.0032   0.3486 
Mexico  0.0737   6.1255**   0.0946   7.1219** 
Philippines  0.0075   1.0966  Break date coincides 
S. Africa  -0.0154   -2.8800**  n.a.  n.a. 
Taiwan -0.0241  -2.7926**  -0.0122  -2.0236* 
Thailand  0.0392   3.9958**   0.0348  2.2216* 
Turkey  0.0901   6.8732**  Break date coincides 
Venezuela  0.0242   3.1498**   0.0342   3.4241** 
Zimbabwe  -0.0039   -0.4484  -0.0178   -2.0377* 
 
** 1% level of significance 
* 5% level of significance  
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Table 5 Difference-in-differences Regression Results for Growth in Number of 
Employees 
 
The difference-in-differences regression equation is  it t i 4 t 3 i 2 1 i it d td td td t y µ + λ + λ + λ + λ + γ = , where yit 
is the number of employees, γi is the intercept term that is allowed to vary from one industry to 
another, t is a time trend.  The dummy variable, di equals to zero if the industry belongs to the control 
group and equals to one if the industry belongs to the treatment group, while dt, equals to zero before 
stock market liberalisation and equals to one after stock market liberalisation. λ4 shows whether the 
growth rates in number of employees are significantly different after stock market liberalisation, after 
taking into consideration the growth rates of economic variables of the control group. The t-statistics 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Panel A shows results when industrial sectors with the lowest 
external equity financing needs are used as control group. Panel B shows results when identical 
industrial sectors in countries that have not undergone stock market liberalisation are used as control 
group. The second column presents results using break dates determined by GP.  The third column 
presents results using official liberalisation dates. The comment ‘Break date coincides’ means that the 
official liberalisation date coincides with that determined by GP. 
 
Panel A: Control Group 1 
  GP-determined break dates  Official liberalisation dates 
  λ4 t-stat. λ4 t-stat. 
Argentina 0.0384  5.8785** 0.0337    4.0209** 
Chile  0.0285  1.9488  Break date coincides 
Colombia  -0.0105  -1.7963  Break date coincides 
Greece -0.0037  -0.6754  -0.0042  -0.4783 
India  0.0001  0.0034  Break date coincides 
Indonesia 0.0301  3.6176** 0.0266    2.2262* 
Jordan -0.0048  -0.2371 0.0099    0.5587 
Korea 0.0114  0.5580  0.0071    0.5375 
Malaysia 0.0077  0.7010  0.0031    0.1953 
Mexico -0.0191  -1.1569  -0.0231    -1.1921 
Philippines 0.0076  0.5515  Break  date  coincides 
S. Africa  0.0005  0.1094  n.a.  n.a. 
Taiwan 0.0120  1.2571  0.0063      0.9202 
Thailand 0.0566  1.7635  0.0704    1.6056 
Turkey -0.0026  -0.3064  Break  date  coincides 
Venezuela -0.0193  -2.7981**  -0.0060  -0.6412 
Zimbabwe 0.0359  4.0057**  0.0297    3.4067** 
 
** 1% level of significance 
* 5% level of significance  
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Panel B: Control Group 2 
  GP-determined break dates Official liberalisation dates 
  λ4 t-stat. λ4 t-stat. 
Argentina  0.0427 6.8770**  0.0283   3.0278** 
Chile  0.0299  2.4350*  Break date coincides 
Colombia  0.0386  5.1852**  Break date coincides 
Greece  0.0221 2.3748*  0.0230   1.9780 
India  0.0317  6.0385**  Break date coincides 
Indonesia  0.0366 4.3228**  0.0463   3.9994** 
Jordan  0.0383 5.1493**  0.0126   1.6656 
Korea 0.0161    1.2531  0.0106    1.4001 
Malaysia  0.0531 5.6883**  0.0643   4.9039** 
Mexico -0.0112  -0.6606  -0.0137  -1.2315 
Philippines  0.0591  5.5969**  Break date coincides 
S. Africa  0.0231  4.0897**  n.a.  n.a. 
Taiwan -0.0092  -1.0232  -0.0177  -1.3993 
Thailand  0.0122 4.0808**  0.0196   3.0372** 
Turkey  0.0209  1.8719  Break date coincides 
Venezuela  0.0128 1.9743*  0.0228   2.3090* 
Zimbabwe  0.0372 4.7832**  0.0405   5.1756** 
 
** 1% level of significance 




Table 6 Difference-in-differences Regression Results for Growth in Number of Firms 
 
The difference-in-differences regression equation is  it t i 4 t 3 i 2 1 i it d td td td t y µ + λ + λ + λ + λ + γ = , where yit 
is the number of firms, γi is the intercept term that is allowed to vary from one industry to another, t is 
a time trend.  The dummy variable, di equals to zero if the industry belongs to the control group and 
equals to one if the industry belongs to the treatment group, while dt, equals to zero before stock 
market liberalisation and equals to one after stock market liberalisation. λ4 shows whether the growth 
rates in number of firms are significantly different after stock market liberalisation, after taking into 
consideration the growth rates of economic variables of the control group.  The t-statistics are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Panel A shows results when industrial sectors with the lowest 
external equity financing needs are used as control group. Panel B shows results when identical 
industrial sectors in countries that have not undergone stock market liberalisation are used as control 
group. The second column presents results using break dates determined by GP.  The third column 
presents results using official liberalisation dates. The comment ‘Break date coincides’ means that the 
official liberalisation date coincides with that determined by GP. 
 
Panel A: Control Group 1 
  GP-determined break dates  Official liberalisation dates 
  λ4 t-stat.  λ4 t-stat. 
Chile  0.0092  0.9747  Break date coincides 
Colombia  -0.0057  -0.7920  Break date coincides 
India  0.0010  0.3135  Break date coincides 
Indonesia  0.0093  1.4314    0.0217   2.3345* 
Jordan  0.0527  3.1660**    0.0432   2.3987* 
Korea  0.0094  0.6318    0.0091   0.9373 
Malaysia -0.0080  -0.4846    -0.0085  -0.3386 
Philippines  0.0392  2.3401*  Break date coincides 
Thailand 0.0525  3.2282**  0.0141    0.4474 
Venezuela -0.0200  -2.8318**  -0.0151  -2.2649* 
Zimbabwe 0.0040  0.4492 -0.0002  -0.0237 
 
 
Panel B: Control Group 2 
  GP-determined break dates  Official liberalisation dates 
  λ4 t-stat.  λ4 t-stat. 
Chile   0.0017    0.0951  Break date coincides 
Colombia  0.0044  0.3556**  Break date coincides 
India  0.0274  3.6466**  Break date coincides 
Indonesia  0.0184 2.0138*  0.0020 0.1107 
Jordan  0.0593 3.8325**  0.0483 2.8529** 
Korea  -0.0377 -1.8505  -0.0469 -1.9583 
Malaysia  -0.0082 -0.3627  -0.0071 -0.6171 
Philippines  0.0333  1.9916*  Break date coincides 
Thailand  0.0362 3.7347**  0.0324 2.9767** 
Venezuela  0.0268 2.1959*  0.0067 0.3904 
Zimbabwe  0.0285 2.8726**  0.0330 2.8915** 
 
** 1% level of significance 
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Appendix A1: Structural Break Dates 
 
Four monthly financial time series, namely (i) stock return, (ii) volatility, (iii) correlation and (iv) US net equity flows/market capitalization, are used separately 
and concurrently as inputs to GP to determine the break dates. Stock returns is the monthly returns of respective countries’ stock indexes obtained from 
S&P/IFC. Volatility is estimated using a GARCH (1,1) model. Correlations between country and world returns are computed using a 36-month moving 
window.  Break dates under Quadravariate are obtained by using all the four time series as inputs to GP. Sample period shows the starting and ending 
months of the time series. 
 
Country  Sample Period  Quadravariate  Return  Volatility  Correlation  Net Flows/Market Cap 
          
Argentina  Jan 88 – Dec 02  Apr – Jun 92 
Jan – Mar 97 
Apr – Jun 92 
Apr – Jun 97 
Apr – Jun 92  Jul – Sep 92 
Apr – Jun 97 
Jan – Mar 92 
Apr – Jun 96 
Jan – Mar 00 
 
Brazil  Jan 86 – Dec 02  Oct – Dec 90 
Oct – Dec 96 
Oct – Dec 96  Oct – Dec 90  Jan – Mar 91 
Jan – Mar 97 
Jul – Sep 90 
Oct – Dec 96 
 
Chile  Jan 88 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 90  Jan – Mar 90  Jan – Mar 90 
Apr – Jun 97 
 
Apr – Jun 90  Apr – Jun 90 
Colombia  Jan 89 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 91 
Oct – Dec 96 
 
Jan – Mar 91  Oct – Dec 96 
 
Apr – Jun 91  Jul – Sep 96 
Greece  Jan 86 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 90 
Jul – Sep 98 
Jan – Mar 90  Jan – Mar 90 
Jul – Sep 98 
 
Apr – Jun 90 
Oct – Dec 98 
Jan – Mar 90 
 
India  Jul 84 – Dec 02  Jul – Sep 92  Jul – Sep 92  Apr – Jun 92  Apr – Jun 00 
 
Jul – Sep 92 
Indonesia  Jan 87 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 93 
Jul – Sep 98 
Jan  - Mar 93 
Jul – Sep 96 
Oct – Dec 98 
Jul – Sep 98  Apr – Jun 93 
Jan – Mar 96 
Oct – Dec 98 
 
Jan – Mar 93 
Jul – Sep 98 
Jordan  Jan 86 – Dec 02  Jul – Sep 92 
Apr – Jun 99 
Jul – Sep 88 
Jul – Sep 92 
Jul – Sep 92  Oct – Dec 92 




Korea  Sep 82 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 89  Jan – Mar 89 
Oct – Dec 92 
Jul – Sep 95  Apr – Jun 89 
Oct – Dec 96 
 
Jan – Mar 89 
 
Malaysia  Jan 86 – Dec 02  Apr – Jun 92 
Apr – Jun 98 
Jan – Mar 87 
Apr – Jun 92 
Jan – Mar 92 
 
Jul – Sep 98 
 
Apr – Jun 92 
Apr – Jun 98 
 
Mexico  Jan 80 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 90  Jan – Mar 86 
Jan – Mar 90 
Jan – Mar 87 
Oct – Dec 89 
 
Apr – Jun 90  Oct – Dec 89 
 
Philippines  Jan 87 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 91 
Jan – Mar 98 
Jul – Sep 94  Apr – Jun 91 
Jan – Mar 98 
Jan – Mar 91 
Apr – Jun 98 
 
Apr – Jun 91 
Oct – Dec 97 
South Africa  Jan 79 – Dec 02  Jan – Mar 93  Jan – Mar 93  Jan – Mar 93  Jul – Sep 98 
 
Jan – Mar 93 
Taiwan  Jan 85 – Dec 02  Oct – Dec 88 
Jan – Mar 98 
Oct – Dec 88  Oct – Dec 88  Jan – Mar 89 
Jan – Mar 98 
 
Jan – Mar 00 
Thailand  Jan 84 – Dec 02  Apr – Jun 90 
Oct – Dec 97 
 
 
Jul – Sep 90 
Oct – Dec 97 
Apr – Jun 86 
Oct – Dec 97 
Apr – Jun 90 
Jan – Mar 98 
 
Apr – Jun 90 
Jan – Mar 98 
Turkey  Jan 88 – Dec 02  Oct – Dec 89 
Jan – Mar 94 
Oct – Dec 97 
Oct – Dec 89 
 
Apr – Jun 94 
Oct – Dec 97 
 
Jan – Mar 90 
Oct – Dec 97 
Oct – Dec 89 
Jan – Mar 94 
Jul – Sep 97 
 
Venezuela  Jan 89 – Dec 02  Apr – Jun 92 
Apr – Jun 98 
 
Apr – Jun 92 
Apr – Jun 98 
 
Jul – Sep 98  Jul – Sep 92 
 
Apr – Jun 92 
Zimbabwe  Jan 90 – Dec 02  Oct – Dec 93 
Jan – Mar 97 
Oct – Dec 93  Oct – Dec 93  Jan – Mar 94 
Jan – Mar 97 
NA  
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Appendix A2: Post Break Dates Response of Financial and Economic Variables 
 
Nine monthly financial and macroeconomic variables are used.  They are (i) stock returns, (ii) dividend yield, (iii) market capitalization/GDP, (iv) net equity 
flows from US/market capitalization, (v) correlation, (vi) turnover ratio, (vii) value traded/GDP, (viii) inflation and (ix) total trade/GDP. The GDP numbers are 
divided by 12 before they are used as denominators.  Total trade is the sum of imports and exports for the month. The final month of the break quarter 
identified by the quadravariate framework is used as the break month.  The regression equation is  t o t D y ε β β + + = 1 , where yt is one of the nine variables 
above, D is a dummy variable and equals 0 for periods before the break dates and equals 1 for periods after the break dates.  To mitigate any possible 
contamination due to the transition period, data three months prior and three months subsequent to the break months are excluded.  If there are multiple 
breaks for the country, the regression period ends three months before the next break date.  Newey-West corrected t-statistics are used to determine the 
level of significance. 
 
           β1      
 Break  Dates (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix) 
              
Argentina Jun  92  -0.0843*  0.0070  0.1207**  0.6336** 0.2102** -0.2512  0.0228**  -1.6618*  0.0226* 
  Mar  97  -0.0410*  0.0061  0.2415** -0.1971  0.2236** -0.9111  0.0035  -0.0054** 0.0356** 
                 
Brazil Dec  90  0.0282  -0.0353**  0.1246**  0.0256**  0.1561**  0.9051*  0.0463*  -0.2062  0.0066 
  Dec  96 -0.0493* 0.0286** 0.1738** 0.0420**  0.3416** 0.2601**  0.0789** -0.8612**  0.0337** 
                 
Chile  Mar  90  -0.0300** -0.0260**  0.4500**  0.0366**  0.2022**  0.1770**  0.0536**  -0.0103** -0.0388** 
                 
Colombia   Mar 91  -0.0575*  -0.0221**  0.1315**  0.1029  0.1347*  0.0549  0.0106**  -0.0046**  0.0091 
  Dec  96 -0.0017 -0.0275** 0.2993** 0.0992* 0.0257  0.3033**  0.0072** -0.0064**  0.0176* 
                  
Greece Mar  90  -0.0400*  -0.0214*  0.1507**  0.0068**  0.0821*  0.2431**  0.8446**  -0.0041**  -0.3769** 
  Sep  98 -0.0132 -0.0282** 0.3707** 0.0008  0.1517** 0.3403**  0.7133** -0.0076**  -0.0768** 
                 
India Sept  92  -0.0355*  -0.0045*  0.2339**  0.0064** 0.0112  0.3309** 0.0311**  -0.0020*  0.0485** 
                  
Indonesia  Mar  93 -0.0470* 0.0967** 0.1220** 0.0338** 0.1758**  0.1605  0.0464**  0.0044*  0.0521** 
 Sept  98  0.0650*  0.0267  -0.1653**  -0.0101*  -0.1940**  -0.1628  -0.0024  0.0055  0.1402** 
                  
Jordan Sep  92  -0.0140*  -0.0118*  0.2259**  NA  0.1245*  0.0058  0.0400*  -0.0577*  0.0984* 
                 
  33
Korea Mar  89  -0.0415**  -0.0208**  0.2099**  0.0052*  0.1803**  0.6898  0.0139**  0.0021*  -0.1233* 
                  
Malaysia Jun  92  -0.0382*  -0.0044*  0.1724**  0.0890**  0.0149  0.3130**  0.1272**  0.0002  0.3326** 
  Jun  98  0.0213  0.0090*  -0.1238**  -0.0701** -0.1466**  -0.2556** -0.1084**  -0.0008  0.2921** 
                 
Mexico  Mar  90  -0.0417**  -0.0175**  0.1782**  0.0581** 0.3115** -0.2164** 0.0063**  -0.0403** 0.1933** 
                 
Philippines  Mar  91 -0.0419 -0.0102** 0.5477** 0.0091**  0.0148*  0.7153**  0.0162** -0.0029* 0.1518** 
 Mar  98  0.0090  0.0039**  -0.1191*  -0.0042*  0.0363**  -0.4702  -0.0072*  -0.0008  0.3068** 
                 
South Africa  Mar 93  -0.0243*  -0.0092**  0.0979**  0.0266** 0.0974  0.5840*  0.1430**  -0.0056** 0.0350* 
                 
Taiwan  Dec  88 -0.0541*  -0.0096** 0.4797** 0.0110  0.0877* -0.0150  0.1033**  0.0017**  -0.0810** 
                  
Thailand Jun  90  -0.0435*  -0.0059*  0.5287**  0.0039** 0.1251*  -0.3156** 0.0186*  0.0002  0.0905** 
 Dec  97  0.0616*  -0.0053  -0.5172**  -0.0027*  -0.1192*  0.1628  -0.0181*  -0.0016  0.2340* 
                 
Turkey Dec  89  -0.1110*  -0.0201*  0.0969**  0.0064**  0.1207*  0.4903**  0.0711**  0.0063  -0.0314* 
  Mar  94 -0.0070 -0.0077*  0.0801** 0.0081**  0.0272 0.6005**  0.1631** 0.0208*  0.1136** 
  Dec  97 -0.0454 -0.0151** 0.1899** 0.0241* 0.1630* 0.2394*  0.3137** -0.0206**  0.0558** 
                 
Venezuela Jun  92  -0.0621*  0.0140**  0.1065* 0.0604** 0.1262** 0.6256** 0.1980*  -0.0023 -0.0566* 
 Jun  98  0.0433*  0.0249**  -0.0409**  0.0168  -0.0444  -0.1051**  -0.1660**  -0.0332*  -0.0282* 
                 
Zimbabwe Dec  93  -0.0040*  -0.0371**  0.0444**  NA 0.3207**  0.6623**  0.0008** 0.0014**  0.2836** 
 
** 1% level of significance 
* 5% level of significance  
 
 
 